MARCELINA V.
ESPINO, G.R. No. 168396
For Herself
And In Representation
of Her
Deceased Mother, EMERENCIANA
V. ESPINO,
and Spouses FELIPE DE LOS
SANTOS and MARISSA DE LOS SANTOS,
Petitioners,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
Spouses RICARDO VICENTE
and EMMA M. VICENTE, Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 22, 2006
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This petition for review assails the
Decision[1]
dated October 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67640 which
set aside the October 25, 1999 Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, in Civil Case No.
431-M-97, as well as the Resolution[3]
dated May 27, 2005 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
Emerenciana
and Doroteo Espino, the parents of herein petitioner, Marcelina V. Espino, were
the owners of two untitled parcels of land denominated as Lots 1475 and 1476,
situated in Bambang, Bulacan and covered
by Tax Declaration Nos. 96-05003-00447 and 96-05003-00449, respectively, with a
total area of 134 square meters. On
The
crux of the controversy in this case arose from the execution by Emerenciana
and Marcelina on
It
appears that sometime in December 1996, Emma convinced Marcelina and
Emerenciana that she could facilitate the registration and titling in their
name of the house and lot where they are staying. Emma allegedly asked Emerenciana and Marcelina
who are both illliterate to sign a document to be used in titling the property
in their name.
Subsequently,
Emerenciana and Marcelina learned that the document they signed was a Deed of
Donation or a “Pagkakaloob,” of the
house and lot in favor of Emma, including the 20 square-meter portion that was earlier
sold to Marissa. As a consequence, when
Emma filed an application for free patent with the DENR-PENRO Office of
Malolos, Bulacan on
Petitioners
then filed a petition[7]
for annulment of patent/title and reconveyance of real property with damages
with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 431-M-97 and raffled to Branch 19.
After due proceedings, the trial
court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants as follows:
1. The “Pagkakaloob” Exhibit “E” of
plaintiffs and Exhibit “1” of defendants is ordered ANNULLED and VOIDED by
reason of fraud;
2. Free
Patent No. 031405-97-10063 issued by the DENR-PENRO of Malolos, Bulacan is
declared by VOID AB INITIO;
3. Tax Declarations Nos. 96-05003-03502
& 03503 and 96-05003-03506
dated
4. Ordering the defendants TO PAY PLAINTIFFS
the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS as and by way of attorney’s fees;
and
5. Costs of suit.
All
other claims of plaintiffs and defendants’ counterclaim are DENIED for lack of
legal and factual basis.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
Respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals which reversed the decision of the trial court and resolved the appeal
as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and the complaint is DISMISSED. The
Register of Deeds for the
SO
ORDERED.[9]
Hence the present petition.
The sole issue for resolution is
whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the lower court’s decision and
concluding that the assailed deed of donation enjoys the legal presumption of
due execution and validity.
Petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals overlooked or disregarded certain factual findings of the trial court
and that it failed to accord due evidentiary weight upon certain undisputed
facts.[10]
Petitioners would want us to rule on
questions of fact in resolving the issue they raised before us, contrary to the
settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review.
Prefatorily, we restate the time
honored principle that in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be raised. It
is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already
considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect. A question of law which we may
pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants.[11]
However,
this rule is not iron-clad. We have
consistently recognized several exceptional circumstances where we disregarded
the aforesaid tenet and proceeded to
review the findings of facts of the lower court such as: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly absurd, mistaken or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the
judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court
or are mere conclusions without citation
of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[12]
Considering
the conflict in the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court and of the
Court of Appeals, we rule on the factual issues as an exception to the general
rule.
The
petition is impressed with merit.
A
donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing
or right in favor of another, who accepts it.[13] Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential. Consent in
contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or
with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free,
and (3) it should be spontaneous.[14] The parties’ intention must be clear and the
attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation
voidable.[15]
For
the petitioners, the vice of consent which attended the execution of the Pagkakaloob
or the deed of donation came in the form of the fraud allegedly perpetrated
by Emma in securing the signatures of Emerenciana and Marcelina. During her direct examination, Marcelina
categorically testified that her signature and that of her deceased mother,
Emerenciana, were procured by Emma through fraud and misrepresentation, thus:
Atty. Cruz:
Q: Going
Back to January, 1997 when you said defendant Emma Vicente came to your house
and told you and your mother that she will assist you in transferring and
registering that property in question, do you remember if there was a document
or kasulatan that she requested you to sign?
Marcelina Espino:
There
is, sir.
Court: What was
your agreement with this Emma Vicente when she went to your house on (sic) January,
1997?
A: According
to her, she will help in the transferring of the property under my name, Your
Honor.
Q: Why,
what is the status of this property? Was is not yet titled?
A: Not
yet, Your Honor.
Atty. Cruz:
When
Emma Vicente told you that she will help and you said she requested you to
sign, do you know what document that she requested you to sign?
A: That
sheet sir. She said she is going to transfer that property under my name.
Q: Was the
document that you signed, the contents of that document, was it explained to
you before you signed?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: How was
it explained to you, if you know?
Atty. Tansinsin, Jr.:
No,
because. . .
Court: Answer.
A: According to her, I should trust her
because she will not fool me, Your Honor.
Atty. Cruz:
Do
you know how to read?
A: No,
sir.
Atty. Cruz:
What
was your educational attainment?
A: Grade
VI, sir.
Court: But surely
you must know how to read Tagalog?
A: No,
Your Honor.
Court: Until
now?
A: No,
your honor.
Atty. Cruz:
The explanation made to you by Emma Vicente about the
document that you were requested to sign is that it will be used to transfer
the property in your name?
Atty. Tansinsin, Jr.:
There is no document yet, Your Honor.
Atty. Cruz:
That is why I laid the basis, Your Honor.
Court: Answer.
A: Yes,
Your Honor.[16]
It
becomes evident from the foregoing that Marcelina and Emerenciana, contrary to
the allegations of the respondents, never intended to donate the subject
property. Thus, the liberality that
necessarily attends every gratuitous disposition is absent in this case. In addition, the act of Marcelina and
Emerenciana of executing the Kasulatan ng Pagwawalang Bisa sa Kasulatan ng
Pagkakaloob[17] after discovering that the respondents
have sought the issuance of a free patent over the subject property supports
the allegation that the intent to donate the subject property was never present
as far as Marcelina and Emerenciana are concerned.
It
is also evident that fraud attended the act of respondent Emma when she
procured the signatures of Marcelina and Emerenciana. There is fraud when, through insidious words
or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to
enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.[18] Moreover, when one of the parties is unable
to read, as in this case, or if the contract is in a language not understood by
him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must
show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.[19] We have scoured the records of this case and
we found no proof that the respondents discharged their legal duty of
explaining to Marcelina, who testified that she and her mother were illiterate,
the terms of the instrument.
The
fraud perpetrated upon Marcelina and Emerenciana having been clearly
established, the lower court was correct in annulling and voiding the Pagkakaloob. As
the trial court ratiocinated:
Pitted
against Marcelina’s categorical denial and clear repudiation of the
“Pagkakaloob”, defendants could only offer the testimony of their son Emerick
Vicente who was not even present during the execution of the questioned
document, Exh. “A” of the plaintiffs. The central figure of the controversy
Emma Vicente deliberately chose to waive her presence much less did she testify
in Court to rebut the testimony of Marcelina. Her failure to testify is
evidence against the defendants. Neither did the defendants present the
witnesses to the “Pagkakaloob” nor the Notary Public, Atty. Cresenciano
Santiago, so they could have controverted and refuted the repudiation made by
Marcelina Espino. This failure is evidence against the defendants. x x x.[20]
The
Court of Appeals anchored its assailed pronouncements on the fact that the Pagkakaloob
was notarized. While it is true
that deeds which have been notarized are presumed to have been duly executed,
this presumption of regularity can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
as in this case. As earlier stated, the
due execution of the Pagkakaloob suffered from infirmities which
derogate from the presumption of regularity that notarization attaches to it. Further, Marcelina testified that she never
appeared before Cresenciano C. Santiago who allegedly notarized the Pagkakaloob.
Anent
the weight accorded by the Court of Appeals to the tax declarations in the
names of the respondents and the realty tax receipts, we hold that while it is
true that tax declarations and tax receipts are good indicia of possession in
the concept of an owner, the same must be accompanied by possession for a
period sufficient for prescription. By themselves, tax declarations and tax
receipts do not conclusively prove ownership.[21] We have reviewed the records of this case and
we find that even at the time of the filing of the application by respondent
Emma Vicente for the issuance of a free patent over the subject property, the
person occupying the same was Emerenciana Espino. Ireneo Guballa, a Public Land
Inspector/Investigator of the CENRO, and a disinterested third party, testified
that Emerenciana and Marcelina were the occupants of the property prior to and
at the time that he conducted the ocular inspection on the premises.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 13-18. Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier
Ranada and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Mario L.
Guariña III.
[2]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 150-155. Penned by
Judge Renato C. Francisco.
[3] Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[4] Court
of Appeals rollo, p. 16.
[5]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 10-11.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, p. 17.
[10]
[11]
[12] Buduhan v. Pakurao, G.R. No. 168237,
[13]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 725.
[14] Lim, Jr. v. San, G.R. No. 159723,
September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 102, 106-107.
[15]
Vitug, Civil Law Annotated, Vol. II, 2003 edition, p. 149.
See also Article 1330 of the New Civil Code:
ARTICLE
1330. A contract where consent is given
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
[16]
TSN,
[17]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 18-19.
[18]
CIVL CODE, Art. 1338.
[19]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1332.
[20] Records, Vol. I, pp. 152-153.
[21] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente
Ermac, G.R. No. 149679, May 30, 2003, 403 SCRA 291, 299.
[22]
TSN,